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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The jury found Andrew Scott Gomez guilty of possession of methamphetamine
after the State put forth three separate theories of possession. For one of these three
theories, Mr. Gomez argued on appeal the State failed to present substantial and
competent evidence. Mr. Gomez also argued the district court’s failure to give the jury a
unanimity instruction was fundamental error. In addition, Mr. Gomez asserted the district
court erred by admitting evidence of marijuana in his vehicle, which only served as
propensity evidence. This Reply Brief responds to some, but not all, of the State’s
arguments. For the issues not addressed herein, Mr. Gomez respectfully refers the
Court to his Appellant’s Brief.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Gomez’s Appellant’s Brief. (App. Br., pp.2–6.) They are not repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated here by reference.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the State present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
Mr. Gomez’s constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine?

II.

Did the district court err when it failed to give a unanimity instruction for the
possession of methamphetamine charge?

III.

Did the district court err when it admitted evidence of the backpack of marijuana?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Mr. Gomez’s Constructive Possession Of Ms. Thompson’s Methamphetamine
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Gomez argued the State failed to present substantial
and competent evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his constructive
possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine. (App. Br., pp.8–12.) The State
correctly states that Mr. Gomez does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for
the other theories advanced by the State, such as the actual possession of the
methamphetamine residue found in the pipe. (Respt. Br., pp.6–7, 7 n.1.) For the
constructive possession theory, however, the evidence was insufficient to show
Mr. Gomez’s control over Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine. The State must show
both knowledge and control and prove each beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 178 (Ct. App. 2014). Although Mr. Gomez may have had
knowledge of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine, he did not have the requisite control.
Similar to State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882 (Ct. App. 1989), Ms. Thompson had not yet
“surrendered” her right of possession to Mr. Gomez at the time of the police
investigation. Id. at 886. Mr. Gomez’s “driving of the vehicle” and “his belief that he
would be paid with a portion of the drugs” goes only toward his knowledge, not control.
(See Respt. Br., p.8.) Mr. Gomez would not have control of the methamphetamine until
he gave Ms. Thompson the ride. Their exchange was not yet “consummated.” Burnside,
115 Idaho at 885–86. Therefore, even though Ms. Thompson and Mr. Gomez were in
the vehicle together, Ms. Thompson still had control of her methamphetamine.
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Mr. Gomez submits the State failed to meet its burden on its constructive possession
theory.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Give A Unanimity Instruction For The
Possession Of Methamphetamine Charge
Based in part on the sufficiency of the evidence argument, Mr. Gomez also
argued the district court’s failure to give a unanimity instruction was fundamental error.
(App. Br., pp.12–20.) The State does not appear to disagree that the absence of
unanimity instruction, if one was required, would violate Mr. Gomez’s unwaived
constitutional rights to a unanimous jury verdict and to be free from double jeopardy.
(See Respt. Br., pp.9–16.) Rather, the State asserts a unanimity instruction was not
required in this case because two of the State’s three theories of possession were part
of the same criminal incident and the third theory, although a separate incident, was
“cured” by defense counsel’s closing argument.
Contrary to the State’s position, two of the three theories—the alleged
constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine and the actual
possession of the pipe residue—were separate and distinct criminal incidents. (See
Respt. Br., pp.12–13.) State v. King, 78 P.2d 466 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994), is instructive.
In King, the police found a Tylenol container with cocaine between the driver and
passenger seats of a vehicle. Id. at 468. The police arrested the defendant, who was
the only passenger in the vehicle, and the driver. Id. During an inventory search at the
police station, the police found more cocaine in a fanny pack, which the defendant had
been wearing at the time of the arrest. Id. The State charged the defendant “with only

4

one count of possession of cocaine.” Id. “In closing argument, however, the State
offered both the Tylenol bottle and the fanny pack as a basis for conviction.”1 Id. at 469.
The Washington Court of Appeals held a unanimity instruction was necessary. Id. The
appellate court reasoned, “The State’s evidence tended to show two distinct instances
of cocaine possession occurring at different times, in different places, and involving two
different containers—the Tylenol bottle and the fanny pack. One alleged possession
was constructive; the other, actual.” Id. As in King, the State’s evidence here showed
two distinct instances of methamphetamine possession “occurring at different times, in
different places, and involving two different containers”—Ms. Thompson’s bra/makeup
bag and the pipe in Mr. Gomez’s underwear. Id. One instance was constructive
possession; “the other, actual.” See id. Moreover, the State failed to present any
evidence on the source of the methamphetamine residue in the pipe or when the pipe
was last used, which further disconnects the two incidents. These two theories were not
alternative factual means, but “multiple incidents of criminal conduct.” Southwick, 177
Idaho at 182.
For the third theory of possession (Mr. Gomez’s admission to smoking
methamphetamine), the State concedes it was a separate criminal incident, which
would require a unanimity instruction. (Respt. Br., pp.9 n.3, 13–16.) Even though it was
error to omit the unanimity instruction, the State asserts Mr. Gomez’s defense counsel
remedied the error with his closing argument. The State’s reliance on defense counsel’s
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The trial court initially proposed a written unanimity instruction. King, 878 P.2d at 469.
The State informed the trial court that it would elect a particular theory in closing
argument. Id. The defense then requested the instruction, which the trial court denied
“in light of the State’s avowed intention to make an election in argument.” Id. The State
argued both theories in closing argument, however. Id.
5

closing argument to remedy this constitutional error is misplaced. At closing, defense
counsel argued to the jury that Mr. Gomez was being charged for “possessing the
methamphetamine at the time of his arrest when they show up at the scene at the car.”
(Tr. Vol. II, p.224, Ls.3–6.) Defense counsel claimed Mr. Gomez was not being charged
with what he did “earlier in the evening,” admittedly smoking methamphetamine and
being “a user.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.224, Ls.1–3.) In contrast, the prosecutor argued to the jury
Mr. Gomez was guilty of possession of methamphetamine under all three theories. (Tr.
Vol. II, p.218, L.17–p.219, L.2, p.219, L.11–p.221, L.9; p.227, Ls.1–3.) The State’s
position on appeal relies on the assumption that the jury found defense counsel’s
argument more persuasive than the prosecutor’s. However, it is equally possible that
the jury was unpersuaded by defense counsel’s argument and considered all three of
the prosecutor’s theories, one of which the State concedes was improper. It is pure
speculation to assign weight to the parties’ arguments.
Setting aside the level of speculation required for the State’s position, it also
presupposes error by assuming the jury disregarded the district court’s instructions and
followed defense counsel’s inaccurate representation of the charged offense. Contrary
to defense counsel’s argument, the charging document simply alleged the unlawful
possession of methamphetamine on or about April 27, 2015, with no other details. (R.,
pp.23–24; Tr. Vol. II, p.64, Ls.12–24 (reading of Information to the jury).) The jury
instruction for the charged offense was similarly vague. (R., p.106.) Thus, neither the
charging document nor the instructions limited the means of conduct for the jury to find
Mr. Gomez guilty. Moreover, the jury was explicitly instructed to follow the law as stated
by the district court and not to consider the attorney’s arguments as evidence. (R.,
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pp.98, 101.) The jury would have to ignore these instructions and actually alter the
charged offense to give effect to defense counsel’s argument. In other words, it must be
assumed the jury acted unreasonably to accept the State’s position. This assumption is
untenable. The Court presumes the jury acts reasonably and follows its instructions,
e.g., State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 690 (2012), and therefore defense counsel’s
inaccurate closing argument did not eliminate the need for a unanimity instruction.
Furthermore, the State’s position allows the defense to dictate the acts upon
which the State may rely to obtain a conviction. The State’s position is that the defense,
through its argument alone, can take one of the State’s theories “off the table.” (See
Respt. Br., pp.14–15.) A unanimity instruction is not necessary if the State elects the act
upon which it will rely for a conviction. State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 173, 174 (Ct. App.
2004) (the “either/or” test). But it is absurd to permit the defense to have the same
control over the State’s case-in-chief. The State’s argument gives the defense the
power to limit the theories of prosecution and choose the particular theory upon which
the State will rely for a conviction. According to the State, the defense can change the
elements of the offense during its closing argument and then instruct the jury on the
newly revised way in which the State can meet its burden of proof. Taking this absurd
proposition further, if the defense and prosecution make conflicting arguments on the
acts constituting the offense, it must be assumed that the jury is somehow able to divine
that the defense’s argument controls. Thus, the State’s position leads to the very result
a unanimity instruction is designed to avoid—“when it appears that there is a genuine
possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors
concluding that the defendant committed different acts.” Id. at 172.
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Finally, it is unreasonable to assume defense counsel’s omission of an
instruction that would protect the defendant’s constitutional rights to a unanimous
verdict and to be free from double jeopardy would be a strategic decision. The State
asks this Court to speculate that defense counsel recognized the need for the
instruction, but instead choose to tangentially (and incorrectly) address the unanimity
issue in closing argument. The State’s speculation that defense counsel made a tactical
decision not to request the instruction is insufficient to show the error did not plainly
exist. See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 167–68 (Ct. App. 2011). There is no
cognizable benefit in failing to request an instruction that would explicitly inform the jury
to agree on the specific act giving rise to the offense. Rather, excluding the unanimity
instruction only increased the odds of the guilty verdict by allowing the jury to disagree
on the specific act, yet still find Mr. Gomez guilty. Mr. Gomez submits he has met his
burden to show a clear violation of his unwaived constitutional rights.
In response to the State’s argument on prejudice, Mr. Gomez respectfully refers
this Court to his arguments in his Appellant’s Brief. (See App. Br., pp.11–12, 19–20.)
For the reasons stated herein and in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Gomez respectfully
requests that this Court conclude the district court’s failure to give a specific unanimity
instruction amounted to fundamental error.

III.
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Evidence Of The Backpack Of Marijuana
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Gomez argued the district court erred by admitting
evidence of the backpack of marijuana at trial for two reasons. First, the State’s offer of
proof was insufficient, and, second, the evidence was irrelevant propensity evidence.
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(App. Br., pp.21–26.) The State responds that the district court admitted the marijuana
evidence pursuant to a different evidentiary rule than argued by the prosecution below.
(Respt. Br., pp.16–19.) Specifically, the State argues the district court admitted the
marijuana evidence as res gestae. (Respt. Br., pp.16–19.) Accordingly, the State
asserts Mr. Gomez failed to challenge the actual basis for the district court’s evidentiary
ruling. (Respt. Br., p.18.)
The principle of res gestae does not provide a separate, independent basis to
admit evidence apart from the Idaho Rules of Evidence. “In 1985, the Idaho Rules of
Evidence were adopted which established that all relevant evidence is admissible,
unless otherwise provided by the Idaho Rules of Evidence or other rules for the courts
of Idaho.” State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240 (2009) (footnote omitted) (citing I.R.E.
402). “[T]he Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of all evidence in the
courts of this State.” Id. Since the Rules control, the concept of res gestae does not
provide a mechanism to admit evidence outside the confines of the Rules. Res gestae
evidence is still subject to the Rules’ admissibility requirements.
Res gestae is a “concept[ ] of relevance. . . . In essence, [it is] shorthand to
explain why certain evidence is relevant.” State v. Sams, 160 Idaho 917, 919 (Ct. App.
2016); see also State v. Alvord, 47 Idaho 162, 272 P. 1010, 1012 (1928) (“This
evidence must be justified, if at all, by its relevancy.”). “Res gestae is defined in part as:
‘The whole of the transaction under investigation and every part of it.’” State v.
Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1305
(6th ed. 1990)). “Res gestae refers to other acts that occur during the commission of or
in close temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be described to
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‘complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly
contemporaneous happenings.’” Id. at 18 (quoting 1 KENNETH S. BROUN
MCCORMICK

ON

ET AL.,

EVIDENCE § 190, at 799 (John W. Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992)). Hence,

evidence that is not strictly probative of the crime charged, but which is “‘inseparably
connected to the chain of events of which the act charged in the information is a part,’”
may be admissible as res gestae. State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 670 (1975) (quoting
Monge v. People, 406 P.2d 674, 678 (Colo. 1965)); see also State v. Miller, 157 Idaho
838, 842 (Ct. App. 2014) (courts can sometimes admit “evidence of events that are not,
strictly speaking, part of the charged criminal episode in order to give the jury a
‘complete story’ if exclusion of the evidence could result in jury confusion or misleading
inferences”). In sum, res gestae is simply another way to describe relevant evidence; it
does not create a new exception for the admissibility of evidence.
Since res gestae evidence refers to other acts than the charged offense, its
admissibility is often curbed by the limitations in Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) “prohibits
introduction of evidence of acts other than the crime for which a defendant is charged if
its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the
defendant’s propensity to engage in such behavior.” Sams, 160 Idaho at 919. The Rule
“is principally designed to protect against admission of purely propensity evidence.” Id.
at 919–20. Of course, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for
“other purposes” as listed in Rule 404(b), such as knowledge or plan. I.R.E. 404(b);
Sams, 160 Idaho at 919; see also Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 18 (noting that the
enumerated “other purposes” for admission of Rule 404(b) evidence is not
“exhaustive”). In this respect, res gestae is essentially “an exception to the general
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prohibition against the use of other misconduct evidence.” Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 17–
18. This exception, however, applies “only where the charged act and the uncharged
act are so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a rational and complete
presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the uncharged misconduct.” Id. at
19 (emphasis added).
Here, Mr. Gomez disputes the State’s assertion that he waived this issue
because he failed to argue the evidence was inadmissible as res gestae. (Respt. Br.,
p.18.) Under the res gestae exception or any other exception to Rule 404(b), the
evidence must be “relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant’s
character or criminal propensity.” State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 913 (2015) (quoting
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013)); see also I.R.E. 402 (irrelevant evidence is
inadmissible). In his opening brief, Mr. Gomez argued that the marijuana evidence was
not relevant to any issue other than propensity. (App. Br., pp.24–26.) Mr. Gomez
contends that this relevancy argument applies regardless of whether the evidence was
admitted under the res gestae or any other Rule 404(b) exception. Therefore,
Mr. Gomez asserts he did not waive this issue on appeal.
Further, Mr. Gomez submits that the district court’s basis in admitting the
evidence could be interpreted as either res gestae or another Rule 404(b) exception,
such as knowledge or lack of mistake. (Tr. Vol. I, p.42, L.9–p.43, L.1 (State’s argument
for admission); Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.14–20 (district court’s ruling).) The district court’s
discussion did not expressly inform the parties it was straying from the State’s proposed
basis for admission and admitting the evidence under a different Rule 404(b) exception.
(See Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.14–20.) Absent an express ruling by the district court, it is
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reasonable to interpret the district court’s ruling as admitting the evidence under the
State’s proposed Rule 404(b) exceptions. Nonetheless, the prevailing inquiry to admit
Rule 404(b) evidence under any exception is that of relevance, which Mr. Gomez
challenged in this opening brief.
Even if the district court admitted the marijuana evidence as res gestae, the
State’s offer of proof remains insufficient to satisfy any Rule 404(b) inquiry. The State
failed to resolve the district court’s initial concerns as to “whatever else” was found in
the vehicle and “what the stops were” before the evidence was admitted. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.44, Ls.12–17.) Due to the lack of information, the State did not show how the
backpack of marijuana was “so inseparably connected” to Mr. Gomez’s possession of
methamphetamine. Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 19. Moreover, the marijuana evidence was
not relevant as res gestae even considering the evidence presented at trial. The State’s
evidence showed Mr. Gomez agreed to give Ms. Thompson a ride in exchange for
methamphetamine. The marijuana in the backpack was completely irrelevant to their
agreement. There was no evidence, as the State suggests, that Mr. Gomez agreed to
transport Ms. Thompson’s marijuana. (Respt. Br., p.18.) Rather, the evidence showed
Mr. Gomez took Ms. Thompson to a Jack in the Box restaurant to pick up some of her
belongings, including the backpack, before he gave her the ride. (Tr. Vol. II, p.147,
Ls.3–18.) There was no evidence that Mr. Gomez knew what was inside the backpack.
(See State’s Ex. 2, 20:08–26:26 (Mr. Gomez denying possession and knowledge of the
backpack’s contents).) The jury could have easily been “given a rational and complete
presentation” of the alleged possession of methamphetamine without any reference to
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the backpack or, at the very least, its contents. Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 19. There was
no reason to add the marijuana evidence to “complete the story.”
Finally, Mr. Gomez asserts the State failed to show the error was harmless. The
marijuana evidence showed nothing more than a propensity to commit drug offenses.
For these reasons and those stated in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Gomez contends the
district court erred by admitting evidence of the backpack of marijuana. (App. Br.,
pp.21–26.)
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gomez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
judgment of conviction and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2017.

________/S/_________________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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